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Abstract
Anti-American attitudes can be found in individuals all over the world. The causes for it relate to both internal
and external sources, which is why a unifying theory based on structure, culture, and institutions must be used
to analyze this issue. Particularly important in individuals’ attitudes are the following variables: nationalist
sentiments; the legitimacy of one’s government; U.S. military, economic, and political intervention in one’s
home country; feelings about democratic values; economic deprivation; and a number of demographics. By
using a survey of over thirty thousand respondents from forty countries, we will hopefully more deeply
understand what makes individuals harbor anti-American sentiments. Results indicate that government
legitimacy and a number of economic indicators are the most important in terms of determining anti-
Americanism, showing that a mix of internal factors and external factors are most important in determining
opinion of the United States.
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ANTI-AMERICANISM AROUND THE WORLD  
 
Nathaniel Erickson 
 
Abstract 
Anti-American attitudes can be found in individuals all over the world.  The causes for it 
relate to both internal and external sources, which is why a unifying theory based on structure, 
culture, and institutions must be used to analyze this issue.  Particularly important in 
individuals’ attitudes are the following variables: nationalist sentiments; the legitimacy of one’s 
government; U.S. military, economic, and political intervention in one’s home country; feelings 
about democratic values; economic deprivation; and a number of demographics.  By using a 
survey of over thirty thousand respondents from forty countries, we will hopefully more deeply 
understand what makes individuals harbor anti-American sentiments.  Results indicate that 
government legitimacy and a number of economic indicators are the most important in terms of 
determining anti-Americanism, showing that a mix of internal factors and external factors are 
most important in determining opinion of the United States.
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Introduction 
Anti-Americanism seems to be the modus operandi for much of the world.  Annoyance, 
contempt, and even hatred can be found all over the globe, and things only seem to be getting 
worse.  It manifests itself in protests ranging from peaceful to violent, comments that can be 
snide, vicious, or even dangerous, and sometimes in violence against American embassies, 
soldiers, and civilians.  It is not fair to say that anti-Americanism always results in violence, but 
it is still a topic that must be discussed.  By looking at this issue empirically, we will hopefully 
delve deeper than the simple explanations that posit that our unilateral actions, exorbitant wealth, 
and actions of our Presidents cause Anti-Americanism, and find out which individuals are anti-
American and why.  Because politicians all over the world denounce the United States’ wealth, 
decadence, and supposed moral decay in order to bolster public opinion of themselves, it only 
makes sense to examine this issue on the individual level, and to make changes that will affect 
people at an individual level. This might help us understand the effect we can plausibly have on 
anti-Americanism around the world. 
A deeper look at this issue would need to look at the extent of American influence 
throughout the world.  This influence could be related to American culture, economics, or the 
military, or, more likely, a combination of all three.  The United States’ history of unilateral 
military action and economic domination throughout the world has sowed discontent for many 
years, and the U.S. may now be seeing more of those repercussions and consequences.  Anti-
Americanism could also be due to internal problems of countries and their leaders’ attempts to 
unite the country through the creation of a scapegoat or common enemy.  As a superpower, the 
United States is the perfect target for this kind of strategy. 
This paper will also try to capture a unique aspect of anti-Americanism, or more 
generally, opinion of the United States.  Since the survey it is based on comes from 2002, the 
data collected come from the time before the United States’ invasion of Iraq.  By looking at this 
period, we run the risk of not including a major factor in anti-Americanism, but at the same time 
it will perhaps better capture the essence of anti-Americanism.  Without such an easy target and 
reason for dislike as the Iraq war, it is possible that respondents had a relatively unbiased opinion 
of the United States.   
 
Literature Review 
Before looking more closely at anti-Americanism, it must be carefully defined.  This can 
be a difficult process, but successful attempts have been made by scholars.  In some literature, a 
loose concept of anti-Americanism is used.  In one example, anti-Americanism is defined as 
something “compromising both the criticism of the American system as such (its global power, 
its model of democracy) and of specific foreign policy” (Fabbrini 2004, 80).  This paper will 
follow in that vein, as will be seen by our parsimonious yet accurate measure of anti-
Americanism. 
In examining factors that explain levels of Anti-American sentiment around the world, a 
broad theoretical approach is necessary.  However, we will also look more specifically at anti-
American theory, particularly what are the sources and causes of it.  These sources can be broken 
down into external and internal sources.  External sources of anti-Americanism are often forms 
of “resistance” resulting from U.S. cultural, military, political, and economic infiltration into a 
foreign country (Tai et al 1973, 456).  In the Middle East, for example, America has a long 
history of conflict with the Muslim world.  It began in the 1700s with the Barbary pirates, who 
seized American ships, sent our sailors to slavery, and then demanded exorbitant ransoms for the 
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men.  Today, America’s military, foreign aid, and religion-based friendship with Israel causes a 
great deal of anti-American sentiment, especially when conservative Arab governments attempt 
to have good relations with the U.S. (Parker 1988, 47).  In Europe, external sources have more to 
deal with the U.S. power and unilateral action, as well as cultural infiltration.  Perhaps this can 
be best be seen from the comments of the French foreign minister in 1995, who called the U.S. a 
hyper-power, saying that the U.S. supremacy has “extended to every aspect of the world’s 
economy, technology, language, and culture” (Fabbrini 2004, 88). 
While resistance to America’s ever widening influence is one cause of anti-Americanism, 
much of it also has to do with foreign countries use of America as a scapegoat.  According to Tai 
et al, individuals under hard conditions will attempt to “direct their hostility toward relatively 
weak and blameless targets.”  While the U.S. is neither weak nor blameless in many cases, the 
U.S. is certainly an easy target for criticism from politicians who in most cases will not 
experience any sort of retaliation from the U.S.  This process is actively promoted by elites, who 
often seek to bolster their domestic position by pursuing foreign policies of conflict (Tai et al 
1973, 459).  Again, the Middle East provides a good example.  It is quite popular for the region 
as a whole to blame America for many different problems (Rubin 2001, 1), but specific events 
and issues often come into play.  In the 1980s, a U.S. hostage was taken in Beirut, not because of 
any “inherent religious or ethnic antipathy,” but because of a “lack of effective governmental 
authority” which led to Lebanon using the United States as a scapegoat.  According to Parker, 
the reason this event occurred was not because of Lebanese hatred for something America was 
doing, but rather the lack of government legitimacy and a negative influence from Iran (Parker 
1988, 51).  We will explore this idea of government legitimacy later, but for now we can see 
some of the internal stresses that cause anti-Americanism. 
Although these categories of external and internal sources of anti-Americanism are 
helpful to think about, the case is never simply one or the other.  Indeed, “neither U.S. presence 
nor internal stress is alone sufficient to generate anti-Americanism (Tai et al 1973, 460).  Further 
complicating these issues is the unit of analysis of this paper, which is the individual.  While this 
paper will look at the influence America has on countries as a whole, we cannot only use these 
macro-sources of anti-Americanism.  According to Parker, opinions of individuals “depend very 
much on the personal situation of the individual in question and on what his or her personal 
interests are” (Parker 1988, 51). 
Since we cannot simply look at the issues in terms of external or internal sources, this paper will 
use a combination of structural, cultural, and institutional approaches.  In terms of a structural 
approach, Parker identifies the following demographic variables as important: income, 
education, race and or minority status, and gender.  (Due to the constraints of the survey being 
used, this paper will only be examining income and gender.)  We will also look at the relative 
deprivation of respondents, which is both an internal stress but also the result of external causes 
such as globalization and imperialism (Taras and Ganguly 11).    
In terms of a cultural approach, nationalist sentiments, democratic values, and religion 
will be examined.  To understand the importance of nationalism, we can look at a survey done on 
the individual level in Panama.  This survey, and the resulting paper, found that higher levels of 
nationalism led to lower levels of support for the U.S. (Perez 1999, 10).  Although this was one 
country, it will be interesting to see if this result applies to the rest of the world.  This survey also 
looked at democratic values, which was a particularly important factor in Panama because of 
George H.W. Bush’s repeated use of the argument that the invasion of Panama would “restore 
democracy,” so it is important to understand how the public feels about democratic values.  This 
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is also important in today’s world, especially because of the world’s seeming disdain for the 
U.S.’s unilateral attempts to spread democracy.  The Panama study seemed inconclusive on this 
point, but others did not.  In a different study, an author found that the measure of democracy 
was statistically insignificant in a regression model involving the ability of the foreign aid 
distribution to affect UN voting (Wang 1999, 207).  In this paper we will hopefully see more 
clearly whether support for democratic values have an effect on individuals’ anti-American 
sentiments. 
Finally, this paper incorporates an institutional approach by including variables such as 
government legitimacy, whether the United States military has intervened in particular country 
and other measures of U.S. presence.  One of the best measures of U.S. presence found in the 
literature was a scale based on seven indicators.  These indicators included U.S. loans and grants 
to the country, U.S. military assistance and aid, U.S. military bases, U.S. direct investment, 
proportional trade with the U.S., U.S. private economic presence, and U.S. tourism presence (Tai 
et al 1973, 464-5).  In terms of government legitimacy, the Panama survey gives us another good 
clue.  According to Perez, support for the political system is very important in Panama in regard 
to their opinion of the United States for two reasons.  The first and most important reason is that 
the United States installed the government.  The second reason is that government legitimacy 
encourages content citizens, which then discourages the government from blaming the United 
States for any domestic troubles, an idea we have already seen in internal stress and scapegoating 
(Perez 1999, 15).  While the idea of the U.S. government creating the government will not apply 
to most of the countries in this survey, government legitimacy’s effect on citizen contentment 
will be very important. 
While examining these variables, it will be necessary to keep track of and control for 
region.  Literature that speaks of Middle-Eastern and Latin American anti-Americanism has 
already been mentioned (Rubin 2001, Parker 1988, Perez 1999), but other regions and countries 
are important too in terms of developing their own personal anti-Americanism.  In South Korea, 
for example, pro-democracy movements took place.  During these, however, public opinion of 
the United States decreased and many of the largest protests occurred at or near American 
structures such as the Embassy and Chamber of Commerce (Gi-Wook Shin 1996, 787).  Even 
among our great allies in Western Europe, there is plenty of peace protests protesting NATO and 
the U.S. that rightly or wrongly are often construed as anti-American acts (Markovits 1985, 3).  
Other scholars point to anti-Americanism’s prevalence in many third world countries, including 
many of the countries of Africa (Rubinstein & Smith 1988).  From these examples, it is clear that 
region plays an important part of anti-Americanism, and must be considered along with any  
other variables. 
 
Data and Hypotheses 
Based on the literature, this paper seeks to understand the effects that a number of 
independent variables have on Anti-American sentiment around the world, as well as some 
demographic control variables.   These factors include an individual’s:  (1) level of nationalist 
sentiments, (2) feelings of legitimacy for one’s national government, (3) support for democratic 
values, (4) level of economic deprivation, (5) a dummy variable measuring whether the United 
States military has intervened in one’s country since 1964 and other measures of military 
influence, (6) overall economic influence, and (7) other demographic control variables.  Where 
possible, the paper uses multiple measures of United States influence, especially in terms of 
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economic and military influence.  Answering these questions is a complex process but the 
following describes the approach in detail. 
This approach will be applied to a survey and data set produced by the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project entitled What the World Thinks in 2002.  The unit of analysis for the data set is 
individuals from around the world.  Originally, the data set had 38,623 respondents from forty-
four different countries (see Appendix for a list of countries).  However, four countries (China, 
Egypt, the U.S., and Vietnam) were cut because some of the questions germane to this paper 
were not asked (including the dependent variable of opinion of the United States).  Thus, there 
are now about 32,000 respondents from forty countries. 
To measure the dependent variable, Anti-American sentiments, this paper will use the 
following question from the survey: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat 
favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States” (What the 
World Thinks in 2002).  Respondents then answer 1 for “Very favorable”, 2 for “Somewhat 
favorable,” 3 for “Somewhat unfavorable,” and 4 for “Very unfavorable.”  While this ordinal 
measure works well for many of the various analytical tools, it will sometimes be necessary to 
collapse the responses into a simpler form, i.e. 1 and 2 for Very and Somewhat favorable will be 
collapsed into “Positive,” and 3 and 4 for Somewhat and Very unfavorable will be collapsed into 
“Negative.”   
My indicator of nationalism comes from the survey question: Do “you completely agree 
[1], mostly agree [2], mostly disagree [3] or completely disagree [4] with [the following 
statement?]  Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others” (What the World 
Thinks in 2002).  If necessary, this variable will also be collapsed in a similar fashion to opinion 
of the United States so that two categories, Nationalist and Non-Nationalist, emerge. 
My indicator of government legitimacy, or respondent’s confidence in their national 
government comes from the survey question: “What kind of influence [is the national 
government] having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of the 
national government very good [1], somewhat good [2], somewhat bad [3] or very bad [4] in 
(survey country)” (What the World Thinks in 2002).  By examining this we will hopefully see the 
effect that legitimacy has on one’s opinion of the United States. 
The measure of democratic values will be based on Freedom House scores from 2002 
(the year of the survey).  Freedom House scores countries on a system going from 1 to 7, with 1 
being the most free and 7 being not free.  In the middle, countries can be ranked as partly free.  
By using this particular measure of democracy (and in the process transferring this country level 
variable to the individual level) we will achieve an understanding of how a country’s overall 
level of democracy affects an individual’s anti- American sentiments.   
Economic deprivation will be measured with the following question: “Have there been 
times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed?  
[…] 1 Yes 2 No.”  This question is very good in that it cuts to heart of the issue quickly.  Other 
questions about income asked whether respondents were satisfied with it, but this question was 
the best in terms of capturing the level of deprivation that might actually cause anti-
Americanism. 
I also created an original variable, U.S. military intervention.  To create this dummy 
variable, I coded each respondent from a country that had experienced U.S. military intervention 
in his/her country anytime between 1964 and 2007.  I created this dummy variable using a 
timeline of U.S. military intervention (http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/ 
interventions.htm).  By using the year 1964, I was able to include a few more countries into the 
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variable that had experienced U.S. intervention.    For respondents who were not alive in 1964, 
this may seem to pose a problem, but it seems clear that one would not need to have direct 
contact with an outside military force to feel its effects, even after the intervention was over.  
Thus, we will hopefully be able to see the effect U.S. military intervention has on one’s opinion 
of the United States. 
To improve the measure of how the U.S. military affects opinion, we will include a 
couple of other indicators.  These indicators come from the scale created by Tai et al.    The first, 
coded in the same way as military intervention, looks at whether a respondent’s country hosts a 
United States military base.  The data comes from the Peace Pledge Union, a group that created a 
map showing U.S. military bases around the world from 2001-2003 (Peace Pledge Union).  The 
other variable, U.S. military aid, measures how much money the United States has given to a 
country to aid its military.  The amounts are in U.S. dollars and are coded based on country in the 
same way as the previously mentioned country level variables (USAID data).  The data are a 
total of the amount of money given between 1964 and 2002. 
In addition to economic deprivation, this country will also look at the level of economic 
influence the United States has in a country.  (These variables also come from Tai et al.)  This 
will be measured by the amount of U.S. direct investment, the level of proportional trade, and the 
total economic assistance.  U.S. direct investment measures how much money the United States 
has invested in foreign countries’ means of productions such as factories.  The data for this came 
from U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs and is quite simply coded in the same country-level 
fashion, with a unit of U.S. dollars.  The next indicator, proportional trade, is slightly more 
complex.  This variable was created by adding up a country’s total imports to and exports from 
the United States, and dividing that number by the total amount of exports and imports.  By 
doing so, a ratio is created in which the higher a number is, the more the United States dominates 
trade with a particular country, and thus is an excellent indicator of economic influence.  The 
data for this variable use a combination of CIA World Fact Book 2002 figures and Trade State 
Express, a program from the U.S. Department of Commerce.  The last indicator, total economic 
assistance, measures how much total money the United States has given to a particular country 
for economic assistance.  It uses the U.S. dollars unit and is coded in the same way as the other 
country-level variables.  This variable comes from the USAID and is a total of the amount of 
money given between 1964 and 2002. 
The final variable measuring a type of U.S. influence is tourism.  This variable was 
created by looking at the number of U.S. citizens who spent at least a night in a foreign country, 
and then dividing this number by the country’s population to control for size.  The greater the 
number, the greater the relative U.S. tourist presence is in a given country.  Data for this variable 
came from the United States Office of Travel and Tourism Industries. 
As far as demographics go, the way they are coded in the survey makes their use very 
difficult.  Education, race, and religion are all coded differently for each country in the survey, so 
it is difficult to make any sort of coherent sense of these variables.  Still, some progress was able 
to be made, but we will only be able to use one proxy measure for religion, which asked 
respondents to rate how important religion is in their life, and one dummy variable, which sees if 
respondents are Muslim.  (Islam was selected as opposed to other religions because of the 
historic hostility between predominantly Islamic countries and the United States.)  Gender is also 
usable, and is coded as 1 for male and 2 for female.   
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Table 1: Variables and Predicted Direction of Correlation 
 
Variables Measure Predicted Correlation 
Direction with DV 
1 Very Favorable 
2 Somewhat Favorable 
3 Somewhat Unfavorable 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Opinion of the 
United States 
4 Very Unfavorable 
-- 
Independent 
Variables 
  
  
  
1 Highly Nationalist 
2 Somewhat Nationalist 
3 Somewhat Non-Nationalist 
Nationalism 
4 Completely Non-Nationalist 
Negative 
1 Very Legitimate 
2 Somewhat Legitimate 
3 Somewhat Not Legitimate 
Government 
Legitimacy 
4 Completely Not Legitimate 
Positive 
1.0-2.5 Free 
3.0-5.5 Partly Free 
Level of 
Democracy 
5.5-7.0 Not Free 
Positive 
1 Deprived 
Internal 
Economic 
Deprivation 2 Not Deprived 
Negative 
0 No Intervention External U.S. Military 
Intervention 1 Intervention 
Positive 
0 No Bases U.S. Military 
Bases 1 Base Present 
Positive 
U.S. Military Aid U.S. Dollars Negative 
U.S. Direct 
Investment U.S. Dollars 
Positive 
Proportional 
Trade Ratio 
Positive 
  
Total Economic 
Assistance U.S. Dollars 
Negative 
1 Male Gender 
2 Female 
Negative 
1 Very Important 
2 Somewhat Important 
3 Not Very Important 
Importance of 
Religion 
4 Not Important 
Negative 
Demographics 
Muslim Dummy 0 Non Muslim Positive 
  1 Muslim  
 
Results 
Having seen which variables will be examined, we will now begin to see which ones 
have the greatest influence on one’s anti-American sentiments.  Before getting into the effects of 
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the independent variables, however, we will begin by taking a broad look at the dependent 
variable, anti-Americanism.  Overall, the results are surprisingly positive as seen in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Opinion of the United States 
 
 Positive Negative 
Overall 59.3% 31.2% 
Africa 78.8% 21.2% 
Latin America 70.4% 26.9% 
South Central Asia 49.1% 50.9% 
East Asia 63.8% 36.2% 
South East Asia 74.9% 25.1% 
Eastern Europe 73.2% 26.8% 
Western Europe 69.5% 30.5% 
North America 73.1% 26.9% 
Middle East 32.4% 67.6% 
   
Overall, 59.3% of the respondents have a positive opinion of the United States, while 
only 31.2% have a negative.  This may be skewed by the countries that are and are not included 
(see Appendix A) but it is still an interesting preliminary result.  Only in the Middle East and 
South Central Asia do the majority of respondents have a negative opinion of the United States 
Now that we have seen what the dependent variable looks like overall, we will now 
examine the effect the independent variables have on it.  For the initial look at the data, a number 
of independent variables will be examined in order to try and explain variance in the dependent 
variable, which is opinion of the United States.  The five variables are level of nationalism, 
whether the United States has had military presence in the country since 1964, legitimacy of the 
national government, support for democratic values, economic deprivation, and demographics.  
The initial results show that my independent variables are relatively weak in explaining variance 
in opinion of the United States.  However, statistical significance is at high levels almost 
universally, which means that we can have a good deal of confidence in the results, even if they 
are weak.  To begin, we will look at bivariate correlation between the DV and several of the IVs.  
The results of the bivariate tests are summarized below in Table 3, and then discussed. 
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Table 3: Bivariate Correlation of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
Bivariate Correlation Results 
Variable 
Pearson's 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Statistical 
Significance 
Expected 
Direction? 
Nationalism -.022 .000** Yes 
U.S.  Military 
Intervention .019 .001** Yes 
Government 
Legitimacy .161 .000** Yes 
Democratic 
Values .129 .000** Yes 
Economic 
Deprivation -.044 .000** Yes 
Gender .066 .000** No 
Importance of 
Religion -.125 .000** Yes 
Muslim 
Dummy 
Variable .209 .000** Yes 
 **Significant at the .01 level 
  
Bivariate analysis of nationalism and opinion of the U.S. reveals a negative relationship, 
meaning that as one’s level of nationalism increases, one’s opinion of the United States 
decreases.  The test produced a Pearson Correlation coefficient of -.022 and a statistical 
significance of .000.  This fits with the pattern mentioned in the introduction, which was that 
correlation is weak, but statistical significance is high.  This correlation seems to make sense 
intuitively, although it is surprising that the correlation is not higher. 
 Bivariate analysis of United State military intervention and opinion of the U.S. reveals a 
positive relationship, which in this case means that if one’s country has been subject to U.S. 
military intervention, one’s opinion of the United States is more likely to be negative.  (U.S. 
military intervention was measured by looking at a timeline of U.S. military intervention.)  The 
test produced a Pearson Correlation coefficient of .019 and a statistical significance of .001.  
Again, correlation is low, but statistical significance is high.  This relationship is also in the 
expected direction, although not as strong as expected.  Perhaps a finer measure of U.S. 
intervention needs to be constructed, rather than simply seeing if the United State military was 
present or not.  The later inclusion of U.S military bases and U.S. military monetary aid will 
hopefully solve this problem. 
 Bivariate analysis of one’s feeling about the national government’s legitimacy and 
opinion of the U.S. reveals a negative relationship, which in this case means that if one feels that 
the government of their country is not legitimate, one’s opinion of the United States is more 
likely to be negative.  The test produced a Pearson Correlation coefficient of .161 and a statistical 
significance of .000.  Although this is the highest correlation yet, it is still quite weak.  Again, 
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however, statistical significance is high so we can have confidence in the result.  The result 
seems to make sense, though again it is not as strong as expected. 
 Bivariate correlation between anti-Americanism and level of democracy reveals a 
positive relationship, meaning that as one’s country becomes less free, one is more likely to 
harbor anti-American sentiments.  The Pearson correlation coefficient of .129 is in the expected 
direction, but is weak.  The statistical significance is high, however, so we can be confident in 
these results.  This result makes sense for two reasons: first, countries that are free are more 
likely to respect the United States for its democratic values.  Second, it seems that free countries 
will also be less likely to need to use the United States as a scapegoat. 
 The direction of bivariate correlation between economic deprivation and anti-
Americanism is negative, with a coefficient of -.044.  This means if one is suffering from 
economic deprivation (measured by whether the respondent has enough money to buy food for 
his or her family) one is more likely to have anti-Americanism sentiments.  This fits with the 
internal stress idea, but the correlation is not very strong.  Statistically, however, the finding is 
significant at the .01 level, so we can be confident in the limited explanatory power of economic 
deprivation. 
 For demographics, this paper will look at the importance of religion, a Muslim dummy 
variable, and gender.  While other demographic variables would be interesting, coding problems 
prevent this from being feasible, so we will only look at the variables mentioned.  Beginning 
with gender, the Pearson correlation coefficient is .066, meaning that if you are female, you are 
more likely to dislike the U.S., and thus if you are male, you are more likely to like the U.S..  
Intuitively, this does not seem to make sense, and indeed the correlation is very weak.  
Statistically, the finding is significant at the .01 level. 
 For the importance of religion, the more important religion is to the respondent, the more 
likely he or she is to harbor anti-American sentiment.  However, the correlation is only -.125 
which, although higher than some of the other findings, is not a very strong explainer of anti-
Americanism.  This finding, although statistically significant (.01 level), may not reveal very 
much information.  Since it does not take into account what religion the respondent is, we are 
missing a very important piece of the puzzle.  The Muslim dummy variable has a positive 
Pearson correlation coefficient of .209, which is the strongest correlation thus far.  It too is 
statistically significant at the .01 level, suggesting that this is a relationship we can have trust in.  
The positive coefficients mean that Muslims are more likely to be anti-American, which matches 
our hypothesis.   
 Before looking further, we must check for multicolinearity among the independent 
variables.  Bivariate correlation reveals that the strongest relationship between any of the 
independent variables is between the Muslim dummy variable and Freedom House rankings, 
suggesting that Muslims often come from remarkably un-free countries.  The finding is 
significant at the .01 level, but both variables will still be included in subsequent analysis.  There 
was also some correlation between the Muslim variable and importance of religion, but again the 
variables will both be left separate and included.  Perhaps one of the most interesting of the 
correlations is between U.S. military intervention and the importance of religion in one’s life, 
with a coefficient of -.160, meaning that if that the U.S. military was present in the respondents 
country, religion is more likely to be important for the respondent.  (Or vice versa, the more 
religious one is, the more like the U.S. military is to come to one’s country.)  There may be some 
interesting material here in terms of the U.S. military putting the fear of God into foreign 
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countries, but for the purpose of this paper we will ignore this weak correlation and move 
without worry into linear regression analysis.   
 The first model we will look at will employ only three of the independent variables, 
which will be nationalism, presence of U.S. military, and government legitimacy.  The linear 
regression model had similar overall results to the bivariate correlation, i.e. correlation was weak 
but statistical significance was generally high. 
 
Table 4: Linear Regression with Nationalism, U.S. Military Presence, and Government 
Legitimacy 
 
Model Summary 
R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Standard 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
0.183 0.033 0.033 1.225 
 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Statistic Significance 
Regression 1657.380 3 552.460 367.985 .000 
Residual 48087.864 32031 1.501     
Total 49745.244 32034       
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  B Std. Error Beta 
t statistic Significance 
Constant 1.936 .021 -- 92.579 .000 
Government 
Legitimacy .175 .006 .151 27.247 .000 
Nationalism .085 .006 .081 14.640 .000 
U.S. Military 
Intervention -.090 .017 -.030 -5.416 .000 
 
Overall, the model, which had opinion of the U.S. as the DV and the three discussed 
variables as the IVs, had an adjusted R square of .033, which is not very high, but a statistical 
significance of .000.  Standardized beta coefficients revealed that government legitimacy is the 
strongest predictor, with a value of .151.  Overall, the model did not perform very well. 
 In this next model, we will look at the same variables as before, but add level of 
democracy, economic deprivation, gender, U.S. Military bases, amount of military aid, U.S. 
direct investment, proportional trade, total economic assistance, tourism, a Muslim dummy 
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variable, the importance of religion, and control for region.  Adding these variables greatly 
improves the model, but it is still relatively weak, as we can see from Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Linear Regression with Nationalism, U.S. Military Presence, Government 
Legitimacy, Level of Democracy, Economic Deprivation, Gender, Importance of Religion, 
Tourism, Additional Economic Measures, Additional Military Measures, and Regional 
Control 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Standard 
Error of the 
Estimate 
.403 .163 .161 1.118 
 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Statistic Significance 
Regression 3296.397 22 149.836 119.933 .000 
Residual 16973.065 13586 1.249     
Total 20269.462 13608       
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Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  B Std. Error Beta 
t statistic Significance 
Constant 3.200 .257 -- 12.448 .000 
Government 
Legitimacy .172 .010 .150 17.272 .000 
Nationalism .135 .009 .132 15.637 .000 
Level of 
Democracy -.289 .092 -.266 -3.143 .002 
U.S. Military 
Intervention 
-.950 .437 -.257 -2.177 .030 
U.S. Military Bases -1.394 .318 -.557 -4.388 .000 
Military Aid -6.36E-005 .000 -.395 -4.593 .000 
Economic 
Deprivation 
-.183 .021 -.075 -8.840 .000 
U.S. Direct 
Investment 
-1.42E-006 .000 -.089 -3.564 .000 
Proportional Trade -3.004 .308 -1.270 -9.754 .000 
Total Economic 
Assistance 
.000 .000 1.833 4.585 .000 
Tourism 10935.338 19289.062 .884 5.672 .000 
Importance of 
Religion 
.044 .011 .038 3.878 .000 
Muslim .585 .073 .137 8.055 .000 
Gender .142 .019 .058 7.327 .000 
Africa -1.406 .187 -.189 -5.588 .000 
East Asia .624 .149 .139 4.190 .000 
South Central Asia -6.374 1.473 -1.919 -4.328 .000 
South East Asia .615 .409 .111 1.503 .133 
Eastern Europe -1.390 .129 -.401 -10.774 .000 
Western Europe .140 .251 .034 .560 .576 
Middle East 1.474 .413 .316 3.571 .000 
North America 2.955 .388 .455 7.618 .000 
 
  The addition of these variables greatly improves the model, but it is still not very strong.  
The adjusted R squared increased to .161 and the model as a whole retained its significance at 
the .01 level.  There are also changes in the standardized beta coefficients.  Most notably, 
controlling for region caused the importance of nationalism to increase from a beta of .081 to 
.132 and for U.S. Military intervention to go from -.030 to -.257.  While neither of these 
coefficients are extremely high, the change in the coefficient warrants attention.  From these 
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changes, we can see that when region is controlled for, nationalism becomes much more 
important in determining one’s level of anti-Americanism.  The same can be said for whether the 
United States military has intervened in one’s country or not, but it should be noted that 
controlling for region makes the statistical significance of this variable decrease to .030.  Thus, it 
is difficult to say what affect, if any, military intervention has on a country’s opinion of the 
United States. 
 In terms of the new variables, some interesting insights can be gained.  The two strongest 
explanatory variables of all are both economic ones.  The first, proportional trade, has a 
standardized beta coefficient of -1.270.  This means that the more the United States dominates a 
country’s trade, the better opinion its people will have of the United States.  This result seems 
somewhat counterintuitive, if one takes it to mean that economic domination helps decrease anti-
Americanism, but this may be a causal relationship direction problem.  Since correlation does not 
always mean causation, we may be seeing that the United States tends to trade with countries 
that have a positive opinion of it. 
 The second powerful economic variable is total economic assistance.  This standardized 
beta coefficient of 1.833 suggests that the more economic assistance the U.S. gives the worse 
opinion its people will have of the United States.  Again, this seems counterintuitive, but it may 
be a phenomenon of reversed cause and effect.  Perhaps we tend to give aid to countries that do 
not like the U.S. in order to improve their opinion of the U.S.  It is also possible that increased 
aid gives respondents a feeling of helplessness, dependence and resentment that causes them to 
dislike the United States. 
 Surprisingly, increased U.S. direct investment does little to affect opinion of the United 
States, at least in comparison to some of the factors.  With a standardized beta of only -.089, it is 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions.  This variable may be weak due to a lack of knowledge 
about America’s activity in this area, or due to more pressing needs that respondents worry 
about.  In either case, it seems that U.S. direct investment in other countries is not a source of 
anti-Americanism. 
 In terms of military influence, we have already seen the effect controlling for region had 
on U.S. military intervention.  In an attempt to refine this measure, however, the variables U.S. 
military bases and military aid were added.  These variables performed quite strongly, with a 
standardized beta of -.557 for military bases and -.395 for military aid.  These negative 
coefficients suggest that if the U.S. has a military base in a country, its people are more likely to 
be pro-America, and that the more military aid the U.S. gives to a country, the more it will like 
the U.S.  While the military aid result makes sense, the positive effect of a military base is 
somewhat odd.  This may be due to reversed cause and effect, or it may also be due to the 
potential boost that could come to a country’s economy by having an American military base on 
its soil. 
 Another measure of influence that was not included in the first model is tourism.  In the 
second model, tourism had a standardized beta of .884.  This positive correlation suggests that 
increased tourism of U.S. citizens to foreign countries causes the host country to have a worse 
opinion of the United States.  Once again, however, this result may be skewed given the 
likelihood that U.S. citizens prefer to go to countries that receive Americans kindly.  Also, 
countries in which United States did not cross a certain threshold in terms of amount of tourists 
were not included.  This could result in certain undesirable countries not being included, and it is 
likely that these countries would have a negative opinion of the United States.  Thus, it is 
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difficult to draw any definite conclusions from the relatively high explanatory power of the 
tourism variable. 
 Another important new variable in the second model is level of democracy.  It received a 
standardized beta of -.266 and a significance of .002.  This suggests that the freer a country is, 
the more likely it is to have a negative opinion of the United States.  This is a very strange result 
and does not match the expectations from the literature or the results of the bivariate correlation 
test.  The reason this occurred is difficult to determine, but it is most likely due to the fact that 
region was controlled for.  Perhaps when region is controlled for, its strong effect wipes out other 
variables explanatory power. 
 And finally, although the regional dummy variables were used more for control, they 
deserve some examination.  A look at the standardized betas reveals that South Central Asia, 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North America are the regions with the strongest opinions 
and most effect on one’s opinion of the United States.  South Central Asia and Eastern Europe 
have negative standardized betas of -1.919 and -.401, respectively, meaning that people from 
these regions are more likely to be pro-American when all other variables are controlled for.  
This is surprising for South Central Asia given its overall approval rate of 49.1% that we saw 
earlier.  Perhaps even more surprising is that the other regions mentioned (the Middle East and 
North America) are more likely to be pro-American.  This makes sense in North America (which 
in this study only includes Canada) but is completely counterintuitive for the Middle East.  The 
initial look at the DV showed that the Middle East had the lowest approval rate of all, so it is 
difficult to ascertain why this result occurred.  Perhaps it is due to the controlling done by the 
Muslim dummy variable and the democracy levels, but one cannot be sure. 
 
Conclusion 
 Because of the relative weakness of both models, it is difficult to make any definite 
conclusions about anti-Americanism, but there are some things we can know.  Instead of 
randomly compiling results into plausible conclusions, however, we will look at the results 
systematically, following the guidelines of internal versus external sources of anti-Americanism.  
In these conclusions, suggestions about U.S. foreign policy will be made, but it should be noted 
that they are relatively simplistic and rely on causal relationships that might not be as sound and 
on results that were relatively weak throughout, despite their nearly universal statistical 
significance. 
In terms of external sources of anti-Americanism, one of the most surprising results of 
the paper is the weakness of the U.S. military intervention.  This could be due to the measure not 
being precise enough, or to problems in terms of a lack of cases that exhibited this phenomenon.  
Whatever the reason, U.S. military intervention performed poorly in bivariate tests, the first 
model, and the second model.  Although statistically significant, its correlation and beta 
coefficients were consistently low.  Attempts to refine this measure were made by including 
whether a country had a U.S. military base on its soil and how much money the U.S. had given 
to the country for military aid.  These variables performed strongly and were effective in terms 
of improving opinion of the United States.  Perhaps we can conclude from this that positive 
intervention by the United States is more easily remembered and long lasting than any negative 
intervention, but this seems hard to believe given history’s seemingly long memory for hardship 
caused by outsiders. 
 In addition to military influence, economic influence proved to be an important external 
factor in determining one’s level of anti-Americanism.  Interestingly, one’s personal level of 
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economic deprivation did not perform well in the models, but this may be due to individuals’ 
tendency to blame themselves for economic hardship before they blame the government.  As 
mentioned, the macro and external measures were surprisingly strong indicators.  Although U.S. 
direct investment was not that important, the proportional trade and total economic assistance 
variables were quite strong, though not in the expected way.  The results showed that increased 
domination of a country’s trade by the U.S. reduced anti-Americanism, and that more total 
economic assistance decreased opinion of the United States.  Neither of these results are 
intuitive, but if they are accurate they suggest that changes in the U.S.’s foreign policy must be 
made.  While it is obviously not U.S. policy to try and get everyone to like the U.S., it seems 
pointless to waste so much money on foreign aid, according to this data.  It would make sense to 
get more involved directly through trade, and perhaps channel more money into military aid 
(assuming these correlations do have the correct causal direction). 
 Having the relative strength and surprising results of the external variables, we will now 
look at the internal variables.  The only consistent indicator throughout was government 
legitimacy.  It performed relatively well in all three tests, and while it did not have any major 
increases, it remained constant when more and more control variables were added to the model.  
This suggests that government legitimacy should be a prime focus of our foreign policy, if the 
U.S. is interested in improving its reputation.  Doing so will decrease discontent, which would be 
good on all levels. 
 Level of democracy did not perform exceptionally well.  Its results were mixed, 
suggesting that it is neither a great help nor hurt to our reputation around the world.  Thus, it 
seems to not make sense to try and spread democracy at such a furious rate, unless it can be 
shown that U.S. interests are purely ideological.  If that is the case, then spreading democracy 
could possibly be a good humanitarian gesture, but it will have little effect on the United States’ 
reputation abroad. 
 Finally, the demographic Muslim dummy variable performed relatively well.  In the 
bivariate tests it was the strongest indicator of anti-Americanism, and in the second linear 
regression model it performed decently in comparison to the rest.  If one combines this 
information with the original dependent variable results that only in South Central Asia and the 
Middle East did the majority of respondents dislike America, as well as the relative strength of 
these variables in the second model as control variables, it seems clear that the United States 
needs to reach out to all parts of the Islamic world.  Our current policies are breeding hatred or at 
least doing nothing to assuage it. 
In the end, the results are slightly dissatisfying.  Correlations could have been higher, and 
some of the variables did not perform as well as hoped.  If the conclusions drawn are accurate, 
they suggest that some fundamental changes need to take place.  Currently, the United States is 
supposedly promoting democracy and setting up legitimate government in Iraq, but our efforts 
seem to only decrease world opinion of America.  While there are Iraqis who are glad to be rid of 
Saddam and his oppressive regime, there are few who are really benefiting from the current 
violence taking place.  In this case, our finding about United States military presence increasing 
anti-Americanism makes sense, but it seems like it should be stronger. 
From all this, it seems clear that anti-Americanism can not be caused by purely internal 
or external factors.  External economic and military factors are important, but no matter how 
good these indicators are they cannot overcome a government that does not enjoy any 
legitimacy.  Thus, our structural, cultural, and institutional approach has provided a decent model 
that provides an excellent start to understanding anti-Americanism. 
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What, then, is missing from the model, or what should be refined? First and foremost, 
demographic variables need to be more carefully examined.  While the importance of religion 
and the Muslim dummy variable performed decently, they did not do much to provide a picture 
of the typical “anti-American,” if such a thing exists.  Better information about religion could 
possibly assess what damage is being caused by our Judeo-Christian based alliance with Israel.  
Demographic information about income would also be good.  While the economic deprivation 
variable was a pretty good proxy, I suspect there were problems with respondents not truthfully 
reporting about whether they had enough money for food or not..  Also, information about race, 
ethnicity, minority status, age, and education would have been very useful. 
In terms of the more substantive independent variables, the military intervention variable 
could provide fertile ground for further research.  Looking at the nature of the conflicts more in-
depth could improve its explanatory power.  Also, some more detailed information about the 
United States history with each country could prove important. 
While it is not within the scope of the survey used or this paper to answer the recently 
posed questions, they do need an answer, so hopefully future research can address these issues.  
With these possible improvements, a better, more powerful model could potentially developed 
that would provide more definite clues as to what changes need to be made in American foreign 
policy.  The United States cannot and should not try to please all foreign nations, but an 
improvement of its image abroad is definitely in order. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix A 
 
Region Country 
U.S. Military 
Intervention 
Angola 1 
Ivory Coast 0 
Ghana 1 
Kenya 0 
Mali 0 
Nigeria  0 
Senegal  0 
South Africa  0 
Tanzania  0 
Africa 
Uganda  0 
Argentina 0 
Bolivia 1 
Brazil 1 
Guatemala  1 
Honduras  1 
Mexico  0 
Peru  0 
Latin America 
Venezuela  0 
Uzbekistan  0 
Bangladesh  0 
India  0 
South Central Asia 
Pakistan  0 
Japan  0 East Asia 
South Korea  0 
Indonesia  1 South East Asia 
Philippines  1 
Bulgaria 0 
Czech Republic  0 
Poland  0 
Russia  0 
Slovak Republic  0 
Eastern Europe 
Ukraine  0 
France  0 
Germany  0 
Italy  0 
Western Europe 
Great Britain  0 
North America Canada 0 
Jordan  0 
Lebanon  1 
Middle East 
Turkey  0 
 
 1=Yes, 0= No 
 
